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Abstract 
In an effort to reduce the risk of sensitive data exposure in 
untrusted networks such as the public cloud, increasing 
attention has recently been given to encryption schemes 
that allow specific computations to occur on encrypted 
data, without the need for decryption. This relies on the 
fact that some encryption algorithms display the property 
of homomorphism, which allows them to manipulate data 
in a meaningful way while still in encrypted form. Such a 
framework would find particular relevance in Clinical 
Decision Support (CDS) applications deployed in the 
public cloud. CDS applications have an important 
computational and analytical role over confidential 
healthcare information with the aim of supporting 
decision-making in clinical practice. This review paper 
examines the history and current status of homomoprhic 
encryption and its potential for preserving the privacy of 
patient data underpinning cloud-based CDS applications.  
Keywords: homomorphic encryption, clinical decision 
support, cloud computing. 
1 Introduction 
In Australia and worldwide, there is a growing impetus 
for adoption of electronic health records (EHRs) and 
personal health records (PHRs). The availability of this 
type of information in clinical care will act as a major 
driver for much needed IT reform in this sector, as well as 
opening up major opportunities for Clinical Decision 
Support (CDS) (AHIC Electronic Decision Support 
Systems Report  2009). The Personally Controlled 
Healthcare Record (PCEHR) is an example of a recent 
Australian initiative to promote patient information 
sharing across caregivers and healthcare provider 
institutions nationally (Pearce and Haikerwal 2010).  
Against the backdrop of these proposed large scale 
health IT infrastructure changes, there has been a rapid 
uptake of cloud computing services by organisations that 
want to flexibly outsource their computational 
requirements according to individual demand (Buyya, 
Yeo et al. 2009).  
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Privacy and security concerns however dominate 
public cloud use in healthcare and constructing a CDS 
system to operate within this environment has 
considerable challenges both technically and socio-
politically (Creating HIPAA-Compliant Medical Data 
Applications With AWS 2012, Schweitzer 2012, 
Demirkan and Delen 2013). As a result, attempts at 
outsourcing computing or analytical processing to third 
parties or using these services as repositories for data 
storage are significantly hindered. In fact, the 
recommendation is to either avoid the public cloud model 
altogether for this type of information or avoid exposing 
unencrypted data to cloud providers (Pearson and 
Benameur 2010, Puttaswamy, Kruegel et al. 2011). If 
public cloud resources are to be utilised under these 
circumstances, there is little choice other than to consider 
encrypting all sensitive data made available on the public 
cloud.  
Standard encryption techniques typically prevent 
further interpretation or manipulation of data, requiring 
the ciphertext to be first downloaded and decrypted 
before computational analysis could be performed on the 
plaintext. Researchers instead have been looking towards 
applying homomorphic encryption (HE) methods as a 
solution for overcoming some of the privacy and data 
control issues in the cloud. Since being first demonstrated 
in 2009 by Craig Gentry (Gentry 2009), fully HE schemes 
that support both addition and multiplication operations 
(allowing arbitrary operations on encrypted data), are just 
becoming efficient enough to be considered practically 
useful. They are still predominantly limited to certain 
specific computations, for instance, finding the statistical 
mean over sets of encrypted quantitative data, searchable 
encryption and private information retrieval (Chow, Golle 
et al. 2009). Although arbitrary computation over 
encrypted data is far from a reality, there may be some 
middle ground where HE schemes with reduced 
computational capacity can still be exploited to facilitate 
secure computation over untrusted IT networks.  
This paper introduces some background concepts 
surrounding CDS, cloud computing and information 
security. It then explores in greater detail the history and 
current literature on HE with a view to evaluating the 
practicality of enabling machine learning (ML) 
algorithms to operate over encrypted data in the cloud. 
Such a ML framework would satisfy the real requirement 
for performing complex and distributed CDS processing 
within the healthcare domain, while maintaining a high 
level of confidentiality. 
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2 Clinical Decision Support and the Cloud 
CDS systems refer to any application that supports 
clinical decision-making and “provides clinicians or 
patients with clinical knowledge and patient-related 
information, intelligently filtered or presented at 
appropriate times to enhance patient care” (Osheroff, 
Teich et al. 2007). ‘Support’ in this case suggests aiding 
rather than making decisions. The general aim of CDS is 
to make data easier to assess, to foster optimal problem-
solving by the clinician, or assist in the automation of 
manual processes (Greenes 2011). These aims have 
implications for improved patient safety and quality of 
care as well as improved efficiency and cost reductions 
for healthcare. ML techniques (such as Naïve Bayesian, 
Decision Tree and Neural Network Classifiers) are used 
in non-knowledge based CDS systems that make 
inferences from data patterns and do not rely on a human 
expert to input knowledge into the system directly 
(Berner 2007). 
Since the introduction of CDS systems in hospital care 
in the early 1970s (Teije, Miksch et al. 2008), there has 
been slow progress to date towards adopting CDS 
systems into mainstream clinical care beyond simple 
reference information display and basic alerting systems 
(Beilby, Duszynski et al. 2005). This is generally 
indicative of the slow growth of IT in the healthcare 
sector, which remains dominated by paper-based 
information systems, where CDS systems have limited 
impact (AHIC Electronic Decision Support Systems 
Report  2009). With the emergence of national EHR and 
PHR systems, there will be a growing requirement for 
applying increasingly sophisticated analytical and health 
information management tools to support clinical 
decision-making and process improvement in healthcare 
practice (AHIC Electronic Decision Support Systems 
Report  2009). This trend is being actively enforced in the 
US through the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act’s ‘meaningful use’ criteria. As part of criteria, CDS 
rule-based interventions operating on EHRs are 
systematically being mandated (Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services  2014). Furthermore, the Department 
of Veterans Affairs in US has called on the industry to 
develop standardised interface specifications for CDS 
“functionality as a service” to be accessed by its 
integrated EHR (Service Interface Specifications for EHR 
Services: Federal Business Opportunities  2012). 
Adoption of cloud computing in healthcare would 
allow relevant applications, such as the aforementioned 
proposed CDS functionality as a service, to have a much 
needed broadening of their processing and analytical 
capabilities applied across a wider range of shareable 
healthcare resources (Armbrust, Fox et al. 2010). Cloud 
computing is viewed as a “style of computing in which 
dynamically scalable and often virtualised resources are 
provided as a service over the Internet” (Dhar 2012). 
Cloud services are designed to flexibly respond to 
changing business requirements and represent a 
fundamental change in the way consumers and 
organisations utilise computing resources. The transition 
is away from owning the system to one where IT systems 
are accessed as a service when required (Soman 2011). 
Cloud computing is increasingly attractive to business 
entities that wish to take advantage of cost sharing, pay-
per-use and on demand provisioning of large scale 
computing resources. Additionally, the ease of use, 
platform-independence and decentralised nature of cloud 
computing allows services to be more sharable across 
entities and are more suitable for group collaboration 
(Soman 2011). 
There are several examples of data-intensive analytics 
and processed-based applications running on cloud-based 
frameworks that are available for research and for general 
industry (Sun and Aida 2010, Fehling, Leymann et al. 
2011, Liu, Charif et al. 2012, Demirkan and Delen 2013). 
Few vendors however are piloting CDS cloud computing 
solutions for use in mainstream clinical care. Notable 
examples include cloud-based real-time monitoring and 
support for rural and remote critical care units (McGregor 
2011), and a shared CDS knowledge repository for 
managing cardiovascular diseases and diabetes in a 
community cloud (Dixon, Simonaitis et al. 2013). In the 
US, the iDASH platform attempts to “level the playing 
field” by providing tools for sharing clinical and 
biological data in a privacy-preserving manner amongst 
the research community. Funded by the National 
Institutes of Health, the platform includes a high-
performance computing environment enabled through a 
private Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA)-certified cloud (Ohno-Machado, Bafna et 
al. 2012). Security appears to be achieved through 
anonymisation techniques, enterprise-grade application 
management, and project segregation leveraging 
virtualisation. Access to the platform is limited to iDASH 
centres or exported to other centres.  
3 Cloud Security 
As with any services containing sensitive health-related 
information, cloud-based systems are required to follow 
legislated provisions enforcing security protections 
surrounding access to patient and healthcare provider 
data. There are severe penalties in cost, patient safety, and 
provider reputation should any malicious or unintended 
security breaches occur.  
A private cloud is able to securely isolate computer 
systems to within a single organisation’s private network 
and away from unsolicited public access, while still 
retaining the benefits of an abstracted IT infrastructure 
offered by a cloud-based architecture (Zissis and Lekkas 
2012). The private cloud however may not satisfy the 
processing power and economies of scale afforded to 
consumers using public cloud services due to the 
relatively lower numbers of computing and database 
resources that are typically available within a private 
network. Confining computing resources within a private 
cloud environment may also limit information sharing 
across a variety of healthcare institutions.  
Even within private IT networks, attacks can occur as 
a result of ‘insider threats’, which are an often-
underestimated risk to an organisation’s information 
security. These threats include accidental disclosures, 
insider curiosity and data breach by insider (Rindfleisch 
1997, Theoharidou, Kokolakis et al. 2005, Appari and 
Johnson 2010). The proportion of insider attacks 
compared to all healthcare provider privacy breaches 
recorded between 2005 to 2013 in the US was 
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approximately 17% (n= 165) (Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse; Chronology of Data Breaches  2013). 
Insider threats could be envisioned for third-party cloud 
vendors entrusted with outsourced provider data. 
In the public cloud however, the security concerns are 
considerable and rely on the fact that computing 
resources are exposed within a dynamic, distributed and 
shared environment, with consumers having little control 
in how data is accessed, proliferated or destroyed. Often 
there is a lack of transparency and accountability when 
cases of privacy breaches occur (Pearson and Benameur 
2010). These properties of the public cloud paradigm 
complicate regulatory, governance and jurisdictional 
directives, which are very prominent in healthcare. 
Additionally, there are a large variety of opportunities 
available for accidental or intentional leakage of personal 
information from vulnerable IT systems accessed from 
publically sharable computing infrastructures. As 
virtualisation enables hardware resources to be shared 
across different users, this introduces new system 
vulnerabilities such as cross-virtual machine (VM) side-
channel attacks that can result in extraction of secret keys 
and other confidential information from cloud instances 
by adversaries (Ristenpart, Tromer et al. 2009). 
Protections should be in place for these types of cloud-
specific attacks. 
 
Figure 1: Scenario for Machine Learning Analysis 
over Encrypted Patient Data in the Cloud 
 
HE is seen as an important technology for overcoming 
some of the privacy and data control issues when 
outsourcing computing and analytical processing to the 
public cloud. If ML analysis could be performed entirely 
on encrypted data, a cloud-based CDS application could 
potentially ensure the privacy of healthcare data that is 
used in both training and classification phases of the ML 
algorithm. Patient medical profiles from a hospital can be 
encrypted using the hospital’s public key and sent to a 
third-party cloud vendor for ML analysis within a high-
performance computing environment. The analysed result 
would be returned while still in its encrypted form and 
could only be revealed using the hospital’s private key. 
The scenario is depicted in Figure 1. Such an approach 
may give both the healthcare institution as well as the 
public cloud vendor the confidence required for 
permitting processing of sensitive information outside of 
the hospital environment. Such an approach could also be 
used to strengthen HIPAA compliance or accreditation in 
a private cloud. In another scenario, a statistical model 
generated from current patient medical profiles from one 
hospital can be used to predict patient outcomes from 
another hospital based on their medical profiles. Ideally 
this outcome would be achieved using a protocol where 
neither party leaks any confidential patient details to the 
other party (Bost, Popa et al. 2014).  
4 Homomorphic Encryption 
4.1 Background 
4.1.1 Definitions 
HE schemes allow meaningful manipulations on 
encrypted data without knowing the secret key (Gentry 
2010). HE schemes that allow simple operations on 
encrypted data have been known for some time. One of 
the first algorithms proposed by Rivest, Adleman et al. 
(1978) as having multiplicative homomorphic properties 
was the well-known Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) 
public-key encryption algorithm. The mathematical 
properties of the algorithm are such that the public-key 
encrypted form of two integers 𝑚1and 𝑚2, denoted as 
𝐸𝑝𝑘(𝑚1) and 𝐸𝑝𝑘(𝑚2), when multiplied together would 
result in the encrypted form of the product of the two 
integers, namely 𝐸𝑝𝑘(𝑚1. 𝑚2). Decrypting this product 
can reveal the correct solution to the actual (plaintext) 
product of two integers. The same public key is used in 
encryption of the two integers while the corresponding 
private key is used in decryption of the ciphertext 
product. 
The ideal requirement is that a HE scheme is 
semantically secure. The notion of semantic security was 
introduced by Goldwasser and Micali (1982), which in 
general terms relates to the fact that an adversary should 
not be able to discover any partial information from a 
ciphertext. Semantic security is equivalent to the concept 
of computational indistinguishability, which is simpler to 
work with in formal proofs (Katz and Lindell 2007). 
Informally it represents a hypothetical situation where an 
adversary supplies two plaintexts, one of which is then 
randomly chosen, encrypted, and then handed back to the 
adversary to determine which of the two plaintexts was 
chosen. With the adversary’s computational powers 
limited to running in polynomial time, the probability of 
choosing the correct plaintext should not be better than ½ 
(plus a negligible factor) (Fontaine and Galand 2009). 
Since RSA is deterministic in its original form, it is 
not semantically secure. Any attempt to make it 
probabilistic breaks its homomorphic properties (Fontaine 
and Galand 2009). Additionally, it leaks some 
information including the fact that integers 0 and 1 have 
the same value in both plaintext and ciphertext form.  
4.1.2 Partial Homomorphism 
The first semantically secure HE scheme was described 
by Goldwasser and Micali (1984) and since then a 
number of additively and multiplicatively HE schemes 
have been described (Fontaine and Galand 2009, 
Vaikuntanathan 2011). Of particular note are the efficient 
and semantically secure HE schemes by Paillier (1999) 
and ElGamal (1985) (including their variants) which are 
additive and multiplicative respectively. These schemes 
display partial homomorphism because they do not 
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support both operations at the same time. A list of the 
most common schemes is presented in Table 1 from 
(Bailey, Bush et al. 2012). 
 
Cryptosystem Homomorphic Operation 
RSA Multiplication mod n 
ElGamal Multiplication, Exponentiation (by 
constant only) 
Paillier Addition, Subtraction, 
Multiplication (by constant only) 
Glowasser-Micali XOR 
Benaloh Addition, Subtraction 
Naccache-Stern Addition, Subtraction, 
Multiplication (by constant only) 
Boneh-Goh-Nissim Unlimited additions, one 
Multiplication 
Table 1: List of Common Partial HE Schemes 
4.1.3 Full Homomorphism 
It was only until 2009 that a fully homomorphic 
encryption (FHE) scheme, which enables arbitrary 
computation over encrypted data, was demonstrated by 
Craig Gentry using ideal lattices in his PhD thesis 
(Gentry 2009). In general, these schemes are based on the 
intractable mathematical problems associated with 
lattices. The lattice points outline ‘tilings’ of the space of 
real numbers in n dimensions (ℝ𝑛). A lattice is 
constructed by combining n linearly independent vectors 
which forms the basis of the lattice, denoted by 𝑉 =
 〈𝑣1 ,∙∙∙   𝑣𝑛 〉. Integral coefficients associated with the 
basis are used to span the entire lattice L (Goldreich, 
Goldwasser et al. 1996). That is: 
 
Two of the most common (conjectured) computational 
problems in lattices include the Closest Vector Problem 
(CVP) and Shortest Vector Problem (SVP). In CVP, the 
problem relates to finding the lattice vector closest to a 
given target vector not on the lattice, while SVP is 
concerned with finding the shortest (non-zero) vector in 
the lattice (Goldreich, Micciancio et al. 1999). Both 
problems are known to be NP-hard to solve and grow 
proportionally (at least) to the exponent of the dimension 
of the lattice (Becker, Gama et al. 2013). In forming a 
public encryption scheme, a one-way computation 
function is required to be constructed, which for the CVP 
could mean adding a small error vector to a point in the 
lattice (the lattice point would have been initially mapped 
to a message). The advantage of lattices over the RSA 
and ElGamal encryption schemes are their reduced 
computation time for encryption and decryption, which 
are of the order of O(k
2
) for some security parameter k, 
since they are based only on simple polynomial 
multiplication. In comparison, the time complexity of 
RSA and ElGamal systems are of the order of O(k
3
). The 
disadvantage of lattice-based encryption schemes is in 
their public key size, which is O(k
2
) compared to O(k) 
(Goldreich, Goldwasser et al. 1997).  
Ideal lattices of the type employed by Craig Gentry in 
the development of FHEs are lattices with some 
additional algebraic structure, such as cyclic rotation of 
the vector set within the lattice basis. This allows for a 
more succinct representation of the n-dimensional lattice 
(using 1 vector) and can be processed more efficiently 
(Lyubashevsky 2008). Homomorphic operations are 
performed by the addition or multiplication of lattice 
points. As there is noise associated with generation of the 
ciphertext, the noise is roughly doubled and squared with 
the addition and multiplication operations respectively. 
This limits the amount of operations that can occur before 
successful decryption is no longer possible, resulting in a 
Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SWHE) Scheme 
(Kocabaş and Soyata).  
The truly revolutionary idea of Gentry was to convert 
the SWHE scheme into a FHE Scheme using a 
bootstrapping method that repeatedly decrypts the 
ciphertext in a self-referential way (ie. recrypt) as a 
means of resetting the ciphertext noise. Each recryption 
operation step also allows only one arithmetic operation 
to be performed before the noise becomes too large and a 
recryption step is required before the next operation. A 
squashing process is necessary to transform the 
decryption scheme to one that is homomorphically 
equivalent but is simplified to allow bootstrapping. The 
repeated cycle of bootstrapping with an additional single 
arithmetic operation allows for the computation of 
arbitrary functions indefinitely (Gentry 2010). By 
handling all possible arithmetic functions, this scheme 
satisfies the criteria of homomorphism, although there is 
an additional requirement of compactness for it to be 
considered FHE. This means that the size of the 
cyphertext (and the time needed to decrypt it) does not 
grow with the complexity of the function being evaluated, 
but rather is dependent (polynomial) on the security 
parameter (Gentry 2010). 
Even though Gentry’s scheme demonstrated that FHE 
was possible, it was too inefficient to be considered 
practical both in terms of computation and storage. 
Estimates showed an 800,000 times storage expansion 
ratio was required for encrypting just one bit, and 99.9% 
of the total execution time was spent on the recryption 
operation (Kocabas, Soyata et al. 2013). 
4.1.4 New generation HE schemes 
There have since been a number of recent improvements 
to the original Gentry scheme making it more efficient 
and practical to use. In 2011, Gentry and Halevi removed 
the requirement for the squashing process but FHE was 
still based on ideal lattices. Concurrently Brakerski and 
Vaikuntanathan also removed squashing by exploiting 
Gentry’s scheme but based it on the much more simple 
and efficient learning with error (LWE) problem. This 
was shown to be equivalent to the hardness of solving the 
SVP problem on any lattices (Brakerski and 
Vaikuntanathan 2014). 
The LWE problem introduced by Regev (2009) states 
that a polynomial number of ‘noisy’ random linear 
combinations of coefficients of a secret vector s of n 
dimensions (modulo q) is hard to solve for s. A shortened 
example directly from Regev (2010) illustrating this 
problem shows that the inputs could be: 
14s1 +15s2 + 5s3 + 2s4 » 8(mod17)
13s1 +14s2 +14s3 + 6s4 »16(mod17)...
 
CRPIT Volume 164 - Health Informatics and Knowledge Management 2015
6
… and so on where each equation has a small additive 
error of say ±1. The answer for s is purported to be hard 
to recover due to the presence of the errors (the answer 
s=[0,13,9,11]). A slight variation of this scheme, the ring-
LWE problem imposes some structure to the linear 
equations making them more compactly represented 
(using smaller keys), more efficient to compute, and can 
still be shown to be hard to solve on ideal lattices in the 
worst case (Regev 2010). 
The new generation schemes developed using (± ring) 
LWE by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan (2014) with later 
refinements from Brakerski, Gentry et al. (2012) removed 
the requirement for squashing and bootstrapping. While 
the scheme could perform additions homomorphically 
within the bounds of noise, a re-linearisation technique 
was used that required a different secret key to perform 
each level of multiplication under a new encryption. In 
this way up to L levels of multiplications could be 
performed using a pre-determined chain of L different 
keys as additional input. This new scheme became known 
as levelled FHE (Togan M 2014). Brakerski, Gentry et al. 
(2012) also introduced a noise management technique 
called modulus switching that relied on switching a 
ciphertext to one with a smaller modulus. This resulted in 
a concomitant decrease in the magnitude of the noise 
without involving a secret key and allowed an 
exponential increase in the number of multiplications that 
could occur (n levels instead of log n) before 
bootstrapping would be required (Vaikuntanathan 2011). 
This particular scheme became known as the BGV 
implementation of levelled FHE after its authors. 
A number of key optimisations and batch techniques 
have reduced overall computation complexity and 
increased efficiency of these FHE schemes. This included 
ciphertext packing techniques for combining multiple 
ciphertexts into a single ciphertext. Packing techniques 
were developed for ideal lattices, binary vectors and (± 
ring) LWE problems (Zhou and Wornell 2014). Single 
Instruction Multiple Operations (SIMD) proposed by 
Smart and Vercauteren (Smart and Vercauteren 2010) 
applied a variation of the ciphertext packing technique 
and were adopted by some of the newer schemes to 
achieve parallelisation of repeated operations by packing 
these bits into the same cyphertext . Various additional 
algorithm and permutation optimisations appear in 
specialised schemes to improve performance (Halevi and 
Shoup 2014). 
Overall there is a complexity associated with lattice-
based cryptography schemes and those based on the LWE 
problem. Setting up the correct secure encryption 
environment involves consideration of a number of inter-
related parameters (Naehrig, Lauter et al. 2011). In 
addition, the schemes break down computational tasks 
into multiple binary operations making it difficult to 
practically accommodate computation and 
communication requirements (Zhou and Wornell 2014). 
Van Dijk, Gentry et al. (2010) introduced the DGHV 
scheme which is a conceptually simpler as it relies only 
on simple integer operations rather than depending on 
single bit manipulations over plaintext. In this way, a 
number of standard computations could be supported. 
The scheme was based on the hardness of solving the 
approximate Greatest Common Divisor (GCD) problem. 
The assumption here is that it is normally simple to solve 
for the GCD of two integers using Euclid’s theorem, but 
this is not the case when small errors are associated with 
each integer (Gentry 2010). 
The initial DGHV scheme was still impractical as it 
involved the use of very large public keys. There have 
since been a number of improvements to the scheme 
including reduction of the public key size (Coron, Mandal 
et al. 2011) and batch processing of a vector of plaintext 
bits as a single ciphertext (Cheon, Coron et al. 2013). 
Cryptosystems that rely on the approximate GCD 
problem however appear to be less efficient compared to 
equivalent (security-wise) lattice-based schemes (Gentry 
2010). 
4.2 Towards Practical HE 
4.2.1 Somewhat HE Schemes 
The performance of FHE operations, have improved 
significantly from a few hours in 2010 to a few 
milliseconds by 2012 (Fau, Sirdey et al. 2013) which has 
given much hope to the ultimate practically of these 
schemes. A current area of intense research is the 
application of SWHE encryption schemes, which are 
more efficient and optimised compared to FHE schemes, 
at the expense of reduced (but sufficient) functionality 
(Naehrig, Lauter et al. 2011, Sen 2013). Even before the 
discovery of FHE, partial HE schemes have been 
exploited for their limited computational capabilities. 
Most HE schemes however (partial HE, SWHE and 
FHE), so far have been predominantly focused on 
specialised functions applied to well-known application 
areas. A list of only some of these areas, include: 
electronic voting/auctions/lotteries (Fouque, Poupard et 
al. 2001, Abe and Suzuki 2002), private set intersection 
(Kerschbaum 2012), private information retrieval (Sion 
and Carbunar 2007), data aggregation in wireless 
networks (Acharya, Girao et al. 2005, Westhoff, Girao et 
al. 2006), watermark and fingerprint schemes 
(Kuribayashi and Tanaka 2005). 
4.2.2 Healthcare Applications  
The healthcare setting is commonly considered a strong 
candidate for HE although many of the suggested 
schemes remain tightly coupled to a particular healthcare 
use case. In healthcare sector, typically the data rather 
than the computations are considered sensitive or private, 
compared to other industries such as the financial and 
advertising sectors (Naehrig, Lauter et al. 2011). 
Currently the implementation status of most health-based 
HE schemes has been at a conceptual level only or there 
may be existing prototypes for performance 
demonstration purposes. Many earlier systems are 
predominantly based on the additively homomorphic and 
semantically secure Pallier cryptosystem. Katzenbeisser 
and Petkovic (2008) for example, describe using the 
scheme to securely calculate an inner product between an 
encrypted and plaintext vector to determine the degree of 
correlation between them. This function could be used to 
privately match a particular patient disease profile 
(mapped into some binary form) against either a reference 
knowledge set of diseases, or specialist disease expertise 
or other patients with similar disease profiles for a 
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community (P2P) networking application. Pallier-based 
HE schemes have also been described in the context of 
privacy preserving statistical analysis of ubiquitous 
(wearable sensor) health data (Drosatos and Efraimidis 
2011); ECG signal classification using private linear 
branching programs (as a generalisation of decision trees) 
(Barni, Failla et al. 2009) and neural network techniques 
(Lagendijk, Erkin et al. 2013); as well as private genomic 
data mining for use in personalised medicine 
(Kantarcioglu, Jiang et al. 2008). 
More recently, the application of levelled FHE 
schemes have been examined in the context of healthcare 
such as in the real-time privacy-preserving analysis of 
medical data acquisition devices over the cloud (Kocabaş 
and Soyata , Kocabas, Soyata et al. 2013). It has also 
been applied to privacy-preserving predictive analysis of 
medical data based on logistic regression and the Cox 
proportional hazard model running in the (Microsoft’s 
Windows Azure) cloud (Bos, Lauter et al. 2014).  Finally, 
FHE schemes have also been explored at a conceptual 
level only (and in a very unclear way) in relation to 
integration with EHRs (Soubhagya, Mini et al. 2013, 
Ikuomola and Arowolo 2014) including the PCEHR 
(Begum, Mamun et al. 2013). 
4.2.3 Generalising HE Algorithms 
A key factor providing FHE protocols with the capability 
to solve real work problems depends on the extent to 
which they can support general computing functions of 
practical interest over encrypted data through sufficiently 
expressive composable primitives. When combined in 
various ways and without loss of generality, these 
primitives would allow for a much wider and more 
practical implementation scope. A number of areas have 
been examined in this space including secret program 
execution, database queries and ML algorithms. 
In secret program execution, at the processor level, 
primitives have been contemplated that would allow 
arbitrary and dynamic program executions through the 
combination of memory access logic, arithmetic and 
encrypted branching operations (Brenner, Wiebelitz et al. 
2011, Brenner, Perl et al. 2012). At an application level, 
primitives such as runtime data-dependent program 
control (if-then-else expressions) and integer 
manipulations provide for a more natural expression of 
high-level algorithms such as array summation, bubble-
sort and Fast Fourier Transform calculations (Fau, Sirdey 
et al. 2013). 
Supporting private database queries over encrypted 
data has received the most attention in this space due to 
the very large potential for the secure storage and access 
of encrypted data in the cloud without the requirement for 
decryption. The general types of operations that are 
required to be supported include complex selection, 
range, join, and aggregation operations, and FHE 
primitives have been shown to support these general 
database queries (Wang, Agrawal et al. 2012, Boneh, 
Gentry et al. 2013). 
5 Privacy-Preserving ML Algorithms 
In generalising machine learning and statistical 
algorithms, when using a SWHE or levelled HE scheme, 
one is limited to functions that can be expressed as a low 
degree polynomial (where there are many additions and a 
small number of multiplications). This includes simple 
statistical functions such as mean and standard deviation 
(Naehrig, Lauter et al. 2011) as well as non-trivial 
machine learning algorithms. This includes binary 
classifiers such as logistical regression, Linear Means 
(LM) classifier and Fisher’s Linear Discriminant 
Classifier (Graepel, Lauter et al. 2013). Note that there is 
no efficient way to do divisions or square roots, which 
would otherwise require more expensive interactive 
protocols between the data owner and the cloud service 
provider of the outsourced algorithm. This would appear 
to preclude algorithms for which there are no division-
free integer derivations. Suggestions for extending these 
methods to other machine learning algorithms were made 
using approximation or decomposition methods, but were 
not demonstrated (Graepel, Lauter et al. 2013). The 
performance of the LM classifier on 30 features from a 
public breast cancer dataset using 100 training and test 
vectors was achieved in approximately 6 seconds. 
Bost, Popa et al. (2014) took quite a different approach 
to generating building blocks that would construct 
classifiers securely. Focusing on the classification rather 
than training phases, what made the authors’ approach so 
unique is that they combine two partially homomorphic 
cryptosystems and a levelled FHE and make frequent use 
of interactive protocols in an effort to make the 
underlying primitives more efficient and flexible, thereby 
supporting a wider scope of secure machine learning 
algorithms. The authors also ensure that these protocols 
are provably semantically secure and in such a way that 
maintains the privacy of both the client’s private input 
and the server’s classifier model (privacy-preserving 
classification). The three encryption schemes used in this 
approach are the Paillier, BGV and the Goldwasser-
Micali cryptosystems. While the first two are examples of 
partial (additive) and levelled fully homomorphic 
cryptosystems respectively, the homomorphic property of 
the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem is exclusive-or 
(XOR) addition modulo 2 (of an encryption of a bit), 
based on the Quadratic Residuosity problem (Goldwasser 
and Micali 1982). The machine-learning primitives that 
are supported using this approach include a comparison 
protocol to find the larger value of two encrypted inputs, 
and argmax protocol to find the index of the largest value 
from a list of encrypted integers, with the latter relying on 
the former protocol. Both protocols require back and 
forth interactions between a client and server. Two other 
supported primitives are a trivial computation of a private 
dot product, as well as a protocol for switching between 
encryption schemes. The latter protocol is also 
interactive, allowing primitives to be securely combined 
in a variety of ways to achieve the broad complement of 
machine learning algorithms.  
The authors illustrate the primitives being used to 
build hyperplane decision classifiers (which covers 
perceptrons, least squares, Fisher linear discriminant and 
support vector machines), Naïve Bayes and Decision 
Trees. They also demonstrate using AdaBoost as a 
technique for combining the classifiers. Despite the use of 
interactive protocols in constructing the three 
classification groups, the use of relatively more efficient 
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partial HE schemes appears to make these algorithms 
more efficient overall. The use of levelled FHE is limited 
to enabling decision tree analysis. A number of medical 
datasets have been used to demonstrate system 
performance, achieving classification times of 
milliseconds to seconds, with a predominant amount of 
time being dedicated to communication during 
interactions.  
6 Discussion 
In review of the research, a number of techniques have 
been uncovered for potentially enabling the practical use 
of homomorphic cryptosystems in ML analysis that could 
be optimised for use in the public cloud environment. The 
field is rapidly evolving and there are many opportunities 
for combining primitives to enable different possible 
secure operations. An example here is the approach from 
(Zhou and Wornell 2014) who demonstrated how to 
process integers more efficiently for certain application 
areas such as feature extraction, recognition, 
classification and data aggregation. An interesting 
question posed by the authors also applies here: 
determining how to best divide machine learning 
computational tasks into “fundamental operations that 
minimize the overall communication and computation 
cost”. 
 
Technique  References 
Automatic parameter selection in FHE 
for correctness and security against 
known lattice attacks. 
(Naehrig, Lauter 
et al. 2011, 
Lepoint and 
Naehrig 2014) 
Dealing with real numbers in arithmetic 
operations. 
(Bost, Popa et al. 
2014) 
Use of Fast Fourier Transforms to 
speed up addition calculations. 
(Bos, Lauter et 
al. 2014) 
Message encoding techniques for ease 
of performing HE operations. 
(Naehrig, Lauter 
et al. 2011) 
Message encoding techniques for 
dealing with large integers. 
(Wu and Haven 
2012) 
Batch techniques to improve 
computation performance. 
(Wu and Haven 
2012) 
Table 2: Practical Optimisations Techniques for HE 
A variety of practical considerations and optimisation 
techniques would be required of any ML system to be 
successfully applied in any real sense. Table 2 lists some 
of the techniques encountered including the references 
that mention using the technique. 
Consideration should also be given to cloud 
optimisation factors, including high bandwidth 
requirements when uploading encrypted data over the 
Internet. The ciphertext size of an FHE scheme like BGV 
can be very large due to the large ciphertext expansion 
(thousands to millions), making transport over the 
network impractical. It has been suggested (Kocabaş and 
Soyata , Naehrig, Lauter et al. 2011, Kocabas, Soyata et 
al. 2013, Lepoint and Naehrig 2014) using a block cipher 
like the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to upload 
data to the cloud (with a minimal expansion ratio) and 
then evaluating the AES homomorphically to perform the 
decryption to FHE which has been achieved by Gentry, 
Halevi et al. (2012). This is a computationally intensive 
step taking around 36 hours (in one implementation) in 
total but could be reduced to 40 minutes per AES block 
using batching techniques. This step however is a one-off 
calculation and could be processed offline using less 
expensive cloud resources. It has been suggested by 
Kocabas, Soyata et al. (2013) that this method could also 
be used to balance storage vs computation requirements 
on the cloud by converting any portion of data 
dynamically from the permanently stored AES encrypted 
form to the (memory intensive) FHE form to perform the 
computation. When sending the computed result back to 
the client in encrypted form, a dimension reduction 
technique can be used convert the message into a shorter 
ciphertext that can no longer support any further 
homomorphisms. In this way the bandwidth issues 
encountered during upload and download of the data to 
the cloud can be avoided. Lepoint and Naehrig (2014) 
suggested the use of a more lightweight family of block 
ciphers, called SIMON (AlKhzaimi and Lauridsen 2013) 
that were more suitable to homomorphic evaluation and 
demonstrated significant improvement in transformation 
rates to a FHE scheme. 
In HE, considerations of a more fundamental nature 
need to be factored into a scheme’s practical 
implementation. In developing any cryptography 
protocol, formal proofs are absolutely essential for 
achieving claims about a particular level of security. 
Formal proofs are strongly recommended over using a 
hit-and-miss strategy, which all too often reveals later 
down the track vulnerabilities from subtle flaws in the 
encryption scheme. Typically, the consequent loss of 
confidentiality cannot be taken back (Lindell and Pinkas 
2009).  
When evaluating the security strength of cryptography 
systems, it is important to take into consideration the 
power of the adversary and the context of allowable 
behaviour. The highest level of security that can be 
attained in the setting of HE is one where the corrupt 
behaviour of the adversary does not deviate away from 
the encryption protocols and only has access to the 
information of all corrupt parties (Fontaine and Galand 
2009). This behaviour model is known as semi-honest 
(honest-but-curious or passive). Furthermore, a HE 
scheme could not offer protection against an adversary 
who has the ability to generate decryptions from 
ciphertexts of their choosing (as often as they wish) under 
the same scheme and given encryption key (Fontaine and 
Galand 2009). Overall, HE can only imply a security 
guarantee equivalent to the basic notion of semantic 
security for public key encryption.  
Finally, HE schemes alone cannot enforce all the 
privacy requirements of a common cloud. An important 
limitation is that all arbitrary encrypted operations are 
restricted to within the domain of a single public key, 
thereby making it difficult to support different levels of 
data access control. In this setting alternative schemes 
would require consideration (Van Dijk and Juels 2010, 
Wang, Agrawal et al. 2012). 
7 Conclusion 
A privacy-preserving machine-learning framework based 
on HE is particularly relevant to the healthcare context. It 
would allay some of the security concerns that are a 
significant impediment to outsourcing of computing or 
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analytical processing of highly confidential patient 
information, to the public cloud. HE appears to be very a 
viable and rapidly evolving technology that has 
significant potential to enable the broadening of CDS 
processing and analytical capabilities across a wider 
spectrum of shareable healthcare resources over the 
cloud. Such CDS services would be more adaptable and 
responsive to changing business requirements as well as 
become more accessible to the general user while still 
preserving confidentiality. 
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